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ORGANIZING CLERICAL WORKERS: 
DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESS 
R I C H A R D W. H U R D and A D R I E N N E McELWAIN* 
This paper investigates factors influencing the outcome of union 
organizing efforts among clerical workers in the private sector. Drawing 
on interviews with union officials involved in clerical organizing 
campaigns, the authors analyze NLRB data on elections held in 1979. 
They find that the percentage of clerical workers voting yes in 
representation elections was related positively to the strength of the 
union presence in the state and employment growth in the industry, and 
negatively to the level of strike activity in the state and management 
resistance to unionization. The delay between the filing of an election 
petition and the holding of the election had no significant effect on the 
vote. 
W I T H employmen t declining in those industr ies where unions have tradi-
tionally been strongest , un ions must ex-
pand their presence in sectors of the 
economy where employmen t is growing in 
o rde r to avoid fur ther declines in member -
ship and influence. Most of the e x p a n d i n g 
industr ies a re in the service sector, where 
clerical workers account for a majority of 
employment . Labor leaders a re aware of 
the impor tance of r e spond ing to the 
changing economy. In a 1984 AFL-CIO 
seminar, for example , several speakers 
called for increased organiz ing activity 
a m o n g women workers in white-collar 
occupations. T h e most notable p r o p o n e n t 
of this position was T h o m a s D o n a h u e , 
secretary- t reasurer of the nat ional AFL-
C I O (Bureau of Nat ional Affairs 1984:77). 
* Richard Hurd is Associate Professor and Adri-
enne McElwain is Assistant Professor, both in the 
Whittemore School of Business and Economics, 
University of New Hampshire. The authors are 
grateful to the University of New Hampshire Faculty 
Development Grant Program for financial support. 
They also thank Jill Kriesky and Denise Blaha for 
research assistance. 
Academic researchers have explored 
some aspects of the chal lenge facing the 
labor movemen t as it a t tempts to organize 
the service sector. Several studies have 
explored the impact of g e n d e r on ex-
pressed interest in unionizat ion or on the 
ou tcome of un ion certification elections 
(see, for instance, Antos , Chand le r , and 
Mellow 1980; Lawler and Hund ley 1983). 
Al though results a re mixed, most analysts 
conclude that women workers a re at least 
as likely as men to suppor t unionizat ion 
(Stephen and Kaufman 1986; Farber 
1985). Some researchers have moved 
beyond the question of g e n d e r to explore 
the unionizat ion potential of workers in 
specific occupations and industr ies . Most 
of these studies have c o m p a r e d b road 
categories of workers , such as white-collar 
workers and blue-collar workers (Maranto 
and Fiorito 1987). N o n e of the publ ished 
research has investigated directly the 
factors that influence suppor t for un ion-
ization a m o n g workers in the clerical 
occupations. This study is an a t t empt to 
fill that void. 
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Professional research on union organiz-
ing in recent years has focused on the 
results of union certification elections 
conducted by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board. Most of the research has 
attempted to statistically explain election 
results for a specific time period based on 
aggregate data (see Heneman and Sand-
ver 1983 for a summary of the research). 
Following a similar approach, this study 
uses election data for 1979 to estimate a 
model of the outcome of NLRB elections 
in units of clerical workers. Although 
some of the independent variables were 
selected based on prior research on NLRB 
elections, others were generated from 
interviews with organizing directors and 
organizers from unions particularly active 
among clerical workers. This reliance on 
interviews with union organizers sets this 
study apart from previous research. 
The Organizer Interviews 
In order to gain a better understanding 
of the factors affecting the outcome of 
NLRB elections involving clerical units, 
interviews were conducted in 1985 and 
1986 with national and local union offi-
cials with relevant organizing experience.1 
Although only ten interviews are cited 
below, the picture that emerges is based 
on more than fifty interviews with repre-
sentatives from eight national unions 
involved in private sector clerical organiz-
ing: the Teamsters, the Service Employ-
ees, the Communications Workers, the 
Food and Commercial Workers, the Of-
fice and Professional Employees, the Auto 
Workers, the International Brotherhood 
of Electrical Workers, and the Hotel 
Employees. 
Specific organizing techniques vary con-
siderably from one union to another, but 
there are a few principles that seem to be 
accepted by most clerical organizers. The 
1
 Interview schedules are available from the au-
thors on request. We interviewed union organizers 
rather than management representatives because it 
was easy to locate organizers with extensive experi-
ence in clerical campaigns, whereas management 
representatives are unlikely to specialize in respond-
ing to clerical worker organizing campaigns. 
organizers portray clericals as very cau-
tious and thorough when considering 
whether to support an organizing cam-
paign. Personal contact with these workers 
is especially important. To facilitate a 
personalized approach, the organizing 
committee is typically quite large, consist-
ing of 10 percent or more of the proposed 
unit. Most organizing takes place during 
small meetings over lunch. Union meet-
ings after work are avoided because 
clerical workers often have responsibilities 
at home to which they must attend.2 
Although organizers vary in the degree of 
emphasis they place on written communi-
cation, all agree that newsletters or flyers 
in clerical campaigns must be prepared 
with careful attention to style, grammar, 
and appearance because clerical workers' 
skills and the demands of their jobs make 
them sensitive to such matters (Kushner 
1986; Lechow 1985; Margolies 1986; Rahke 
1986; Saporta 1986; Schaffer 1985). 
Organizers sometimes target selected 
groups of clerical workers, and occasion-
ally even mount advertising campaigns to 
attract interest, but most organizing occurs 
in response to inquiries from workers. 
Contrary to the impression given by press 
reports about a few high-visibility clerical 
locals, "women's issues" are seldom central 
to a clerical organizing campaign. Al-
though many clerical organizers are eager 
to promote issues such as child care or pay 
equity, private sector clericals do not 
typically view their workplace concerns 
from a feminist perspective. In fact, 
traditional trade union issues predominate 
in most clerical organizing campaigns (Hill 
1985; Margolies 1986; Saporta 1986; Schaf-
fer 1985). Further, as is true for other 
types of workers, union organizing among 
clerical workers is most likely to succeed 
where the workers suffer arbitrary and 
unfair treatment or economic neglect by 
management (Margolies 1986; Nussbaum 
1986; Schaffer 1985). 
Although the organizers interviewed 
agree that private sector clerical workers 
2
 For a case study of the clerical organizing 
campaign at Yale University, which typifies this 
approach, see Hurd 1986. 
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are open to unionization, they view clerical 
organizing as very slow in comparison to 
organizing among other types of workers, 
and they do not expect dramatic member-
ship gains among these workers in the 
short run. Three main reasons are cited 
for this opinion. 
First, the personalized organizing ap-
proach described above is more time-
consuming than traditional plant gate 
leafleting supplemented by mass union 
meetings and rallies. Second, because most 
clericals are women who have, in varying 
degrees, accepted the subservient role 
implicit in their jobs, more attention must 
be given to building self-confidence than 
in campaigns among other groups of 
workers. Third, clericals typically have 
little prior personal experience with unions, 
and tend to view them as institutions 
dominated by angry groups of male 
employees. It takes time to build confi-
dence and break down stereotypes, and 
frequently some type of educational pro-
gram must be integrated into the organiz-
ing campaign in order to accomplish these 
objectives (Kushner 1986; Ladin 1985; 
Nussbaum 1986; Rahke 1986; Saporta 
1986; Schaffer 1985). 
The biggest barriers to organizing pri-
vate sector clerical workers all relate to 
fear—fear of job loss, fear of strikes, and 
fear of being ostracized by fellow workers 
or management. Being on friendly terms 
with management is more important to 
clericals than to most other workers, 
because clerical workers typically interact 
regularly with management as part of 
their job. Fear of strikes is also more 
prevalent among clericals than among 
other workers. This fear usually stems 
either from a misunderstanding of unions 
and how the decision to strike is made or 
from a desire to work out differences 
amicably in order to maintain a congenial 
working environment. Fear of job loss 
may be based on the fear of being fired 
for union activity or it may reflect famil-
iarity with major layoffs by unionized 
employers in the industry or local area 
(Kazel 1986; Kushner 1986; Margolies 
1986; Nussbaum 1986; Saporta 1986). 
Union avoidance consultants are present 
in most elections and play on the fears of 
clericals in their campaigns (Kazel 1986; 
Nussbaum 1986; Rahke 1986). The con-
sultants use legal challenges to delay 
elections in order to obstruct the organiz-
ing campaign. Although it takes longer for 
unions to lay the groundwork for elections 
in clerical units, once a petition has been 
filed the organizing committee expects the 
process to move quickly; delays create 
frustration and hurt morale (Kushner 
1986; Nussbaum 1986; Saporta 1986). 
Where workers are already familiar with 
unions, union avoidance campaigns floun-
der, fear is less of a problem, and the 
organizing process is speeded up consider-
ably. Knowledge of unions can come from 
any of several sources: other employees at 
the same workplace may be represented 
by a union, unions may have a strong 
presence in the community, family mem-
bers or close friends may have experience 
with unions, or the employees who are 
objects of the organizing drive may them-
selves have prior personal involvement in 
a union (Hill 1985; Kushner 1986; Margo-
lies 1986; Nussbaum 1986; Rahke 1986; 
Saporta 1986; Schaffer 1985).3 
The interviews with organizers high-
light some potentially important factors 
influencing the outcome of union repre-
sentation elections among clerical workers. 
As explained below, several of the hypoth-
eses suggested by the interviews are 
similar to those tested in prior research on 
union certification elections in non-clerical 
units. Other hypotheses, however, either 
have not been tested previously or at least 
3
 Although the interviews focused on organizing 
among private sector clerical workers, the organizers 
made frequent observations comparing private sec-
tor campaigns with public sector campaigns. Public 
sector campaigns are widely viewed as less difficult 
for unions for several reasons: opposition from 
management is not as stiff and management consult-
ants are not as common; access to workers on the job 
is more open; organizing proceeds more quickly, and 
the intensive personalized organizing approach is less 
likely to be necessary; and because of legal limitations 
on public sector strikes, the fear of strikes is not a 
major issue. Some organizers specifically observed 
that in the near future unions will focus on public 
sector clerical organizing because it is less difficult 
(Margolies 1986; Nussbaum 1986; Rahke 1986). 
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take on new meaning because the inter-
views suggest explanations that differ 
from those offered in prior studies. 
Empirical Model 
Studies of union certification elections 
typically either analyze the individual's 
decision to vote for or against representa-
tion or analyze the election itself. Because 
our goal is a better understanding of the 
factors affecting the outcome of a union 
certification election among clerical work-
ers, we adopt the election-level focus. The 
outcome of an election can be specified 
either as the proportion of voters who vote 
for union representation or as a win-lose 
dichotomous variable. We examine a per-
cent-vote model in the belief that this 
specification reveals more about the elec-
tion outcome than does a simple dichoto-
mous specification. In addition, the factors 
that are hypothesized to influence the 
decision to vote for or against union 
representation may significantly affect the 
proportion of individuals voting for the 
union without altering the election out-
come. 
We have chosen to classify the factors 
influencing the outcome of a union certi-
fication election into three categories: 
variables related to worker interest in 
unionization, variables related to manage-
ment resistance to unions, and miscella-
neous election and bargaining unit charac-
teristics. Each of these categories is 
discussed below. Table 1 presents defini-
tions and data sources. 
Variables Related to Worker 
Interest in Unionization 
Level of unionization. The level of union-
ization in the state is included because 
nonunion workers can be expected to be 
more open to unionization in states where 
unionization is firmly established than in 
other states. Seeber and Cooke (1983) 
have demonstrated a significant positive 
relationship between the level of unioniza-
tion in a state and the union victory rate in 
elections among all types of workers, and 
the interview results lead us to expect the 
same to hold for clerical workers. Seeber 
and Cooke define the variable as the 
percentage of workers organized in the 
state in which the election is held. We 
define a variable in this manner but we 
also explore the impact of an alternative 
measure of the level of unionization: the 
number of locals in the state per thousand 
employed. We feel that a worker's aware-
ness of unions in a state may be more a 
function of the number or "saturation" of 
locals in the state than of the percentage 
of workers who are unionized. That is, the 
amount of publicity unions enjoy may 
hinge more on the number of locals than 
on the number of union members. 
Labor movement vitality. Because unioniza-
tion is not common among clerical work-
ers, they are likely to be particularly 
influenced by the vitality of the labor 
movement in their local area. If the labor 
movement is growing in their area, the 
prospect of unionization should be more 
appealing. If the labor movement is 
shrinking in their area, the prospect of 
unionization may appear not only less 
attractive, but even threatening. 
As in the case of defining level of 
unionization variables, for labor move-
ment vitality we use two measures: the 
change from 1975 to 1980 in the percent-
age of the labor force that was unionized 
in the state, and the change in the number 
of locals per thousand employed in the 
state. We believe the latter is the better 
measure. The number of union members 
may change due to the expansion or 
contraction of employment in unionized 
workplaces independent of any action on 
the part of organized labor. A change in 
the number of locals, on the other hand, 
reflects either successful organizing of 
new units or, conversely, the decertifica-
tion of existing units or shutdown of 
unionized facilities. 
Strike activity. Our interviews with union 
organizers indicated that opposition to or 
fear of strikes is a significant issue in many 
clerical organizing campaigns. We hypoth-
esize that the level of strike activity in a 
state will be negatively related to the 
percentage of clerical workers voting for 
the union because such activity can be 
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Table 1. I n d e p e n d e n t Variables Used in the Regression Analysis. 
Hypothesized Sample 
Sign of Proportion Standard 
Variable Coefficient or Mean Deviation Source 
LOCALS 
Number of locals in state per 
thousand employed, 1979. 
CHANGE IN LOCALS 
no. locals in 1980 
no. employed 1980 
no. locals in 1977 
no. employed in 1977. 
PERCENT ORGANIZED 
Percentage of workers organ-
ized in the state in which the 
election is held, 1979. 
CHANGE IN 7, ORGANIZED 
Percentage of workers organized 
in 1980 minus the percentage 
organized in 1975. 
STRIKE ACTIVITY 
Proportion of workers in state 
who went on strike during 1979. 
EMPLOYMENT CHANGE 
Index for the period 1970-1978. 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
For clerical workers, by state, 1979. 
WAGE RATIO 
A weighted average of 1979 
median earnings of full-time 
clerical workers and median 
earnings of full-time sales work-
ers divided by a weighted aver-
age of median earnings of all 
full-time male and all full-time 
female workers. 
STIPULATED 
1 if stipulated election, 
0 otherwise. 
ORDERED 
1 if Board-ordered or Regional 
director-ordered, 0 otherwise. 
DELAY 
Between filing of petition and 
election (in months). 
CLERICAL EMPLOYMENT RATIO 
Clerical employment relative to 
total employment, by industry. 
SIZE 
VOTER TURNOUT 
MULTI-UNION 
1 if more than one union in-
volved in the election, 0 other-
wise. 
+ 0.597 0.225 
+ -0 .056 0.036 
+ 27.769 7.666 
+ -5 .975 2.135 
0.019 0.011 
+ 1.236 0.244 
4.706 0.904 
0.861 0.030 
0.789 0.408 
0.162 0.369 
1.908 1.589 
0.299 0.203 
42.141 108.079 
0.910 0.116 
+ 0.029 0.168 
Number of locals for 1977 and 
1980 from Gifford (1984-85, 
Appendix B); number of locals 
in 1979 estimated by linear inter-
polation. Emploved persons bv 
state from U.S. BLS (1977-80). ' 
Percent organized by state from 
Troy and Sheflin (1985, 
Table 7.2). 
U.S. BLS (1981a, Table 21). 
U.S. BLS (1981b, Table 2). 
U.S. BLS (1977-80). 
U.S. Bureau of the Census (1983, 
Ch. D: "Detailed Population Char-
acteristics," Table 222). 
NLRB Tape. 
NLRB Tape. 
NLRB Tape. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census (1984, 
Part 7-C, Table 4). 
NLRB Tape. 
NLRB Tape. 
NLRB Tape. 
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expected to exacerbate these fears. At 
least one other study has investigated the 
impact of strike activity on NLRB election 
results, but in a somewhat different 
context. Maranto and Fiorito (1987) tested 
the impact of a specific union's strike 
activity on that union's likelihood of 
victory in a representation election. Al-
though their hypothesis of a negative 
relationship is similar to ours and is 
generally supported by their empirical 
tests, our interest is focused on the level of 
strike activity in the state rather than a 
specific union's reputation. 
Change in industry employment. An index 
of the change in employment in the 
relevant three-digit SIC industry over the 
eight-year period prior to the election is 
included to reflect the health of the 
industry. Given that clerical workers are 
largely unorganized, we postulate that 
they will be more inclined to favor 
unionization if employment in the indus-
try is expanding. Where employment is 
declining, unionization might be viewed as 
hastening the decline by increasing labor 
costs. This variable is designed to capture 
in part the barrier to unionization posed 
by the fear of job loss noted by clerical 
organizers. 
We should mention that this hypothesis 
is at odds with Seeber's (1983) hypothesis 
concerning union organizing in manufac-
turing in the 1973-76 period, although 
the negative relationship he hypothesized 
did not prove to be significant. Seeber's 
focus, however, was on production work-
ers in manufacturing, among whom union-
ization was firmly established in the 
mid-1970s. Clerical workers can be ex-
pected to respond quite differently be-
cause unionization is less common in 
clerical occupations and therefore poten-
tially more threatening in an industry with 
declining employment. 
Unemployment. The unemployment rate 
for clerical workers in the state is included 
as one measure of economic conditions. 
Although those studies that have used 
unemployment as an independent vari-
able have not established a significant 
relationship between that variable and the 
union victory rate (see Heneman and 
Sandver 1983:533), we nevertheless hy-
pothesize that a higher unemployment 
rate among clerical workers will discour-
age support for unions by increasing the 
fear of job loss. 
Relative wages. Studies of the determi-
nants of the voting behavior of individuals 
have found that a substantial proportion 
of the variance in voting behavior can be 
explained by employee satisfaction levels 
(Heneman and Sandver 1983:539). In 
election-level studies, the satisfaction of 
the employees is also likely to influence 
the outcome of a union election. Kochan 
(1979) has demonstrated that one factor 
affecting job satisfaction is the perceived 
equity in pay scales among different types 
of workers. This finding is consistent with 
the observation of clerical organizers that 
economic neglect is often a prime motiva-
tor for unionization. 
Unfortunately, lack of data makes it 
impossible to construct a variable measur-
ing the pay of clerical workers relative to 
other workers in the company in which 
the election is being held. Instead, we use 
state-level data to define a wage ratio 
variable that is the ratio of median clerical 
workers' earnings to the median earnings 
of all workers in the state.4 Higher levels 
of the wage ratio should lead to more job 
satisfaction among clerical workers and to 
lower union victory rates. Therefore, we 
hypothesize a negative relationship be-
tween the dependent variable and the 
wage ratio variable. 
Variables Related to Management 
Resistance of Unions 
Type of election. Heneman and Sandver 
(1983:551) urge researchers to maintain 
distinctions among consent, stipulated, 
regional director-ordered, and Board-
ordered elections in order to control for 
"differing conditions surrounding the elec-
4
 The problem of not having data at the appropri-
ate level of aggregation is not limited to this variable. 
It would be best to have data not only on 
company-specific relative wages but also on employ-
ment, unemployment, and unionization at the level 
of the appropriate local labor market rather than at 
the state level. 
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tion and differing attitudes and behavior 
on the part of labor and management." 
Seeber and Cooke (1983) note a signifi-
cant positive relationship between consent 
elections and the union victory rate. They 
hypothesize that a consent election indi-
cates a lack of strong management resis-
tance to the organizing campaign and 
employer satisfaction with the definition 
of the election unit. 
As Cooke (1983:406) describes it, a stip-
ulated election indicates that the employer 
"wants a hearing about unit determination 
and wants disputes over campaign activi-
ties and election outcomes to be resolved 
by the five-member Board." Cooke's state-
ment is not totally accurate, because a stip-
ulated election is like a consent election ex-
cept that one of the parties (usually 
management) "reserve[s] the right to raise 
these issues after the election takes place" 
(Taylor and Witney 1979:225). Nonethe-
less, the employer's reservation of the right 
to challenge such issues as the scope of the 
unit, the eligibility of employees, the time 
and place of the election, and related mat-
ters indicates a more cautious, less cooper-
ative attitude toward the election than 
would be expected of managers who ac-
cept a consent election. An employer who 
chooses a stipulated election rather than a 
consent election is therefore likely to be 
more aware of strategies to reduce the 
chance of a union victory and more likely 
to mount an active campaign against union-
ization. Given the report by organizers that 
union avoidance consultants are present in 
most clerical elections, the distinction be-
tween consent and stipulated elections is 
likely to be important. 
On the other hand, consent elections 
reflect less disagreement than exists in 
regional director-ordered or Board-
ordered elections. A regional director- or 
Board-ordered election may occur if an 
appeal of election details is filed before the 
election takes place. Alternatively, a new 
election may be ordered if an unfair labor 
practice was committed that influenced 
the outcome of the original election. 
Because of the acrimony that would exist 
in either case, an ordered election is less 
likely to result in a union victory than a 
consent election. 
We define two dummy variables to ac-
count for the differences among these types 
of elections. The first takes on a value of 
one for a stipulated election and the sec-
ond takes on a value of one for a regional 
director-ordered or a Board-ordered elec-
tion. The coefficients on these variables 
both reflect a contrast with consent elec-
tions, and therefore we hypothesize a neg-
ative relationship between each of these 
variables and the percent vote for the 
union. 
Delay. Consistent with the opinions of 
the clerical organizers we interviewed, the 
relationship between the union victory 
rate and the delay from the filing of an 
election petition to the conduct of the 
election has been found to be consistently 
negative in those studies that included a 
delay variable (Heneman and Sandver 
1983:544). Support for unions tends to 
erode with delay for two reasons:5 the 
elapsed time allows management to mount 
a campaign against the union, and, simul-
taneously, the enthusiasm and time com-
mitment of the union organizing team 
(typically dominated by members of the 
work unit devoting personal time to 
organizing activity) tends to wane. 
Clerical employment ratio. An employer's 
incentive to resist unionization depends on 
the impact that unionization is expected to 
have. Seeber (1983) suggests that the cap-
ital to labor ratio is important because the 
potential impact of unionization on cost in-
creases with the ratio of labor costs to total 
costs. The capital to labor ratio is probably 
not as important a factor in management 
resistance to clerical worker organizing as 
it is in resistance to organizing efforts by 
production workers, however, because in 
many industries (including all of manufac-
turing) clerical workers account for a very 
low proportion of total employment. We 
therefore define a variable that measures 
the ratio of clerical employment in the in-
3
 These arguments are specific to delays after the 
filing of an election petition. Delays from the 
beginning of organizing to the filing of an election 
petition cannot be measured in the NLRB data. 
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dustry to total employment in the industry. 
Ceteris paribus, the higher this ratio, the 
greater the incentive for management to 
resist unionization and the lower the ex-
pected pro-union vote. 
Miscellaneous Election and 
Bargaining Unit Characteristics 
Unit size. Unit size has been one of the 
most thoroughly investigated variables in 
prior research on NLRB election out-
comes. Increases in the size of a unit are 
hypothesized to be associated with less 
cohesiveness among the employees and 
reduced employee communication, so that 
one might expect a negative relationship 
between unit size and the percentage of 
workers voting for union representation. 
Prior empirical studies have consistently 
found such a relationship (see Heneman 
and Sandver 1983:544). Following Cooke 
(1983), we introduce the unit size variable 
as I/SIZE, where SIZE represents the num-
ber of employees eligible to vote in the 
certification election. 
Voter turnout. The few studies that have 
examined voter turnout in an election 
have found it to be negatively related to 
the union victory rate (Heneman and 
Sandver 1983:544). The explanation hy-
pothesized for this result is that marginally 
interested voters tend to support the 
status quo, and therefore their participa-
tion reduces the union's chances of win-
ning. This explanation accords with the 
accepted wisdom among management con-
sultants, who typically advocate an aggres-
sive "get-out-the-vote" campaign to im-
prove the odds for a defeat of the union 
(Gagala 1983:72-73). 
Number of unions. Some elections involve 
more than one union contending for votes. 
The presence of more than one union or-
ganizing campaign is likely to increase em-
ployee awareness and interest and increase 
the proportion of employees voting for 
union representation. Furthermore, be-
cause unions vary significantly in style, milit-
ance, and organizing strategy, with more 
than one option the individual worker is 
more likely to find a union choice that 
matches his or her preferences. 
Multi-union dummy variables have been 
used in only a few studies of election 
outcomes (see, for example, Delaney 1981; 
Becker and Miller 1981). In spite of 
statistically insignificant results in prior 
studies, Heneman and Sandver (1983:552) 
urge researchers to incorporate variables 
that distinguish between single union and 
multi-union elections because "interunion 
comparisons and rivalry . . . may play a 
significant role in influencing the results 
of multiunion elections." 
Data and Results 
We chose to analyze NLRB elections 
held during 1979 because it was the onlv 
year for which we could get detailed data 
for all of our variables. During 1979 there 
were 735 conclusive NLRB elections held 
in units consisting of office, clerical, and 
other white-collar workers.6 A number of 
these elections are not included in our 
empirical analysis. We have deleted 70 
decertification elections, 19 employer-
petitioned elections, one expedited elec-
tion, 11 elections held outside the United 
States, and 12 observations because of 
missing or bad data.7 Our final sample 
consists of 622 elections, 54.7 percent of 
which were won by a union.8 
Table 2 contains the results obtained 
11
 Conclusive elections are those in which a decision 
is made —that is, in which one of the alternatives on 
the ballot receives a majority of the votes and no 
run-off election is necessary. If no alternative 
receives a majority, a run-off is held between the two 
highest vote-receiving alternatives. The NLRB data 
set does not include the first inconclusive election 
results. If a run-off is necessary, only the results from 
the run-off election are available. 
' We are interested in elections in which the union 
has conducted a standard organizing campaign and 
has voluntarily filed for an election. Emplover-
petitioned and -expedited elections occur under un-
usual circumstances, typically involving organiza-
tional picketing and sometimes violations of the 
N.L.R.A. section 8.b.7 restrictions (Mvers and 
Twomev 1975:265-66; Tavlor and W'itnev 
1979:299-300, 464-65). We would expect these 
elections to turn out quite differently from those in 
which the union has requested an election, and thus 
we have excluded them from our sample. 
"By comparison, unions had a win rate of 41.6 
percent in elections held among production workers 
in 1979. 
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Table 2. Determinants of Election Outcomes for Private Sector Clerical Workers, 1979. 
Independent Variable 
LOCALS 
CHANGE IN LOCALS 
PERCENT ORGANIZED 
CHANGE IN 7c ORGANIZED 
STRIKE ACTIVITY (a) 
(b) 
EMPLOYMENT CHANGE INDEX 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
WAGE RATIO 
STIPULATED 
ORDERED 
DELAY 
CLERICAL EMPLOYMENT RATIO 
1/SIZE 
VOTER TURNOUT 
MULTI-UNION 
Intercept 
No. of Observations 
R2 
F 
Dependent 
(1) 
0.144** 
(0.069) 
0.807*** 
(0.345) 
— 
— 
-3 .737** 
(1.613) 
— 
0.076** 
(0.045) 
-0 .002 
(0.013) 
-0 .445 
(0.445) 
-0 .082* 
(0.051) 
-0 .070 
(0.058) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
-0 .087* 
(0.054) 
0 74|*** 
(0.099) 
-0 .031 
(0.096) 
— 
0.931 
622 
0.105 
5.959 
Variable: Percent Vote for Union Representation 
(standard error in parentheses) 
(2) 
0.127** 
(0.075) 
0.666** 
(0.335) 
— 
— 
— 
-3.740** 
(2.155) 
0.071* 
(0.045) 
-0 .006 
(0.013) 
-0 .459 
(0.480) 
- 0 . 0 8 1 * 
(0.051) 
-0 .076* 
(0.058) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
-0 .082* 
(0.054) 
0.759*** 
(0.099) 
-0 .024 
(0.096) 
0.154*** 
(0.065) 
0.956 
622 
0.111 
5.831 
(3) 
0.129** 
(0.069) 
0.763** 
(0.344) 
— 
— 
-3 .381** 
(1.614) 
— 
0.074* 
(0.045) 
- 0.004 
(0.013) 
-0 .424 
(0.443) 
-0 .079* 
(0.051) 
-0 .074 
(0.058) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
- 0 . 0 8 3 * 
(0.054) 
0.761*** 
(0.099) 
-0 .022 
(0.096) 
0.151** 
(0.065) 
0.909 
622 
0.113 
5.949 
(4) 
— 
— 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.010* 
(0.007) 
-1 .973* 
(1.332) 
— 
0.062* 
(0.045) 
-0 .015 
(0.014) 
-0 .116 
(0.566) 
-0 .069* 
(0.051) 
-0 .064 
(0.058) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
-0 .075* 
(0.054) 
0.752*** 
(0.099) 
-0 .021 
(0.096) 
0.156*** 
(0.065) 
0.664 
622 
0.109 
5.735 
* Significant at the .10 level; ** significant at the .05 level; *** significant at the .01 level (one-tailed tests). 
from ordinary least squares estimation of 
four specifications of the model. In all 
cases the dependent variable is defined as 
the number of votes for union representa-
tion divided by the total number of votes. 
The multi-union dummy variable is ex-
cluded from specification (1) but included 
in specifications (2), (3), and (4). The only 
elections included on the NLRB tape are 
conclusive elections. In cases of a first 
election involving two unions resulting in 
a run-off election involving only one of 
the unions, the multi-union dummy vari-
able takes on a value of zero, indicating 
the presence of only one union in the 
actual conclusive election included in our 
data set. The fact that there was at one 
time more than one union vying for 
employee support cannot be taken into 
account in our multi-union variable. Be-
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cause biases may arise if this dummy 
variable does not accurately account for 
the number of unions that are or were 
candidates in the election, we present a 
specification that excludes this variable.9 
As is readily apparent from the results 
reported in Table 2, the presence of more 
than one union vying for support in an 
election is a significant factor in increasing 
the proportion of employees who vote for 
union representation, but the remaining 
coefficients are not affected when the 
multi-union dummy variable is deleted. 
Specifications (1), (3), and (4) employ 
the strike variable that measures the 
proportion of workers in the state who 
went on strike during 1979. It could be 
argued that this measure does not accu-
rately capture the perceived strike activity 
for those elections held early in 1979. 
Because of our particular interest in 
clerical workers' fear of strikes, we define 
a second strike variable for inclusion in 
specification (2): the average of strike 
activity in 1978 and 1979 if the election 
was held in the first six months of 1979, 
and simply strike activity in 1979 if the 
election was held in the last six months of 
1979. 
Specifications (1), (2), and (3) use the 
variables on the number of locals to 
measure unionization levels. Specification 
(4) differs from the other specifications in 
the use of the more conventional measure 
of unionization level —percentage of work-
ers organized in the state in which the 
election was held. 
An examination of Table 2 shows that, 
except for the delay variable, the signs of 
the coefficients are those expected. Be-
cause of our strong a priori ideas on the 
signs of the coefficients, the hypothesis 
tests for the statistical significance of the 
individual coefficients are all performed 
as one-tailed tests. The F-ratio indicates 
that a statistically significant relationship 
exists between our set of independent 
variables and the percent vote for union 
representation. 
• We have identified only nine elections in which 
this inaccuracy could have occurred. 
Variables Related to Worker Interest 
in Unionization 
The coefficients on the six variables 
reflecting worker interest in unionization 
are all of the hypothesized sign. In 
general, these variables contribute signifi-
cantly to the explanatory power of the 
model. Both the number of locals per 
thousand employed in the state and the 
change in the number of locals per 
thousand employed affect the percent 
vote positively and significantly. The same 
is true when the variables measuring the 
percent organized are used. These results 
are consistent with our hypotheses and 
indicate that the voting behavior of clerical 
workers is quite sensitive to the vitality of 
the labor movement. 
Our hypothesis regarding the intimidat-
ing effect of strike activity in the state is 
also supported by the evidence. Higher 
levels of strike activity lead to a lower 
proportion of votes for union representa-
tion. The health of the industry also has a 
significant influence on the percent vote. 
Clerical workers apparently do view union-
ization as being threatening in a declining 
industry. 
The coefficient on the unemployment 
rate variable is small in magnitude and not 
statistically significant. This result is con-
sistent with the findings of other studies, 
and suggests that clerical workers are no 
more influenced in their voting behavior 
by the unemployment rate than are 
production workers. 
The final variable hypothesized to influ-
ence the worker's perceived benefit from a 
union is the wage ratio, which measures 
median clerical earnings relative to me-
dian earnings of all workers. The coeffi-
cient reflects the hypothesized negative 
relationship, but it is neither statistically 
significant nor large in magnitude. This 
result is not surprising, because what 
should really influence the voting behav-
ior of clerical workers is their percep-
tion of the equity between their wages and 
the wages of non-clericals employed by the 
same company. Our wage ratio variable 
measures relative earnings at the state 
level and is therefore only a rough proxy 
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for what we really would like to measure. 
In addition, at the state level this variable 
exhibits considerably less variation than 
would an election-level wage ratio. 
Variables Related to Management 
Resistance to Unions 
With one important exception, the 
coefficients of the variables related to 
management resistance to unions have the 
expected sign and are significant. Stipu-
lated elections and regional or Board-
ordered elections result in a lower propor-
tion of workers voting for representation 
than in consent elections. The coefficient 
is larger in magnitude, and more often 
statistically significant, for the stipulated 
than for the ordered elections. 
The coefficient on the delay variable is 
the only one that does not have the 
hypothesized sign.10 The magnitude of 
this coefficient is very small, however, and 
not significantly different from zero. This 
result may be a reflection of the cautious 
nature of clerical workers. In clerical 
units, there is typically a much longer 
period of organizing activity prior to the 
petitioning for a vote than in other types 
of units. In addition, an examination of 
the delay variable indicates that the aver-
age delay is shorter in clerical elections 
than in elections among other types of 
workers (1.91 months versus 2.22 months) 
and the variation in delay is also smaller (a 
standard deviation of 1.59 months versus 
2.84 months). Thus, a delay appears not to 
have much of an impact on the decisions 
clerical workers made during the long 
organizing process. 
The coefficient on the clerical employ-
ment ratio variable is negative and statisti-
cally significant, supporting our hypothe-
sis that higher levels of clerical employment 
relative to total employment provide a 
greater incentive to management to resist 
10
 Concern about possible multicollinearity be-
tween the delay variable and the election-type 
dummy variables led to a re-estimation with the 
election-type variables excluded. The sign, magni-
tude, and lack of statistical significance of the 
coefficient on the delay variable were unaffected. 
unionization and therefore result in a 
lower percent vote. The magnitude of the 
coefficient is small, however. 
Miscellaneous Election and Bargaining 
Unit Characteristics 
Two of the miscellaneous election and 
bargaining unit variables have a significant 
influence on the percent vote for union 
representation. The coefficient on the 
1/SIZE variable supports the hypothesis of 
a negative relationship between unit size 
and percent vote for the union. The 
multi-union variable also affects the per-
cent vote significantly and positively as 
hypothesized. Although the coefficient for 
the voter turnout variable has the hypoth-
esized negative sign, the relationship is not 
significant. 
Importance of Organizer Interviews 
Because ours is the first econometric 
study of NLRB certification elections that 
generates hypotheses from interviews with 
union organizers, it is appropriate to 
evaluate the influence of the interview 
results on the analysis. Although several 
previous studies have tested the impact of 
the level of unionization on election 
results, none have included variables mea-
suring the change in level of unionization. 
Our interviews convinced us that for 
clerical workers a key issue considered in 
union representation elections is the vital-
ity of the labor movement. We subse-
quently defined two variables intended to 
capture vitality, as described above. The 
statistically significant relationship be-
tween these variables and the percent vote 
for a union lends support to the observa-
tions of the organizers. 
Also suggested to us by the interviews 
was the strike variable, which also proves 
to be significant. Specifically, strike activity 
in the local area was viewed as an 
inhibiting factor in clerical organizing 
campaigns. Although a similar variable 
has been included in one prior study, it 
was defined based on the specific union's 
involvement in large strikes whereas our 
variable is geographically defined. 
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Several of the variables we included 
were suggested to us not only by our 
interview results, but also by prior re-
search on NLRB certification elections: 
level of unionization, relative wages, type 
of election, delay, and clerical employment 
ratio. In the case of the delay variable, the 
interviews helped us explain why our 
results differ from those of other studies. 
As noted above, delay after the filing of 
the election petition probably has less 
impact in clerical campaigns than in 
campaigns among production workers 
because the organizing process before 
filing is usually slow and methodical. 
One variable suggested to us by the 
interviews, change in industry employ-
ment, has been tested in a prior study, but 
with a reverse hypothesis. The positive 
relationship we predicted (because the 
union representatives we interviewed saw 
job loss as a negative influence on attempts 
to organize clericals) is substantiated by 
the econometric results. 
In short, we believe that the interviews 
were useful to us both for developing 
hypotheses and for explaining the results 
of our econometric tests. We strongly 
encourage other researchers interested in 
union organizing efforts to conduct inter-
views with practitioners from labor organi-
zations, management, governmental agen-
cies, and consulting firms prior to statistical 
analysis of the NLRB data. 
Conclusions 
The outcome of union organizing ef-
forts among private sector clerical workers 
will influence the future makeup, focus, 
and vitality of the U.S. labor movement. 
In this paper we have investigated some of 
the factors that will help determine 
whether these efforts are successful. Based 
on interviews with union organizers and 
an analysis of NLRB elections involving 
clerical units, we have identified several 
variables that have a significant impact on 
the willingness of clerical workers to vote 
for unionization. 
We believe that our most interesting 
results relate to environmental factors 
influencing clerical workers' support for 
unionization. Specifically, clerical workers 
are more likely to vote for union represen-
tation in states where the unions have a 
strong presence, particularly if the union 
movement is expanding. Strike activity in 
a state, however, negatively affects clerical 
union representation votes. Recent initia-
tives by some unions to pursue non-strike 
alternatives (ranging from increased coop-
eration with management via employee 
involvement plans to "in-plant" strategies 
such as work slowdowns) may actually 
help create an environment more condu-
cive to clerical organizing. Finally, our 
results indicate that clerical workers are 
more likely to vote for a union if they 
work in an industry with increasing em-
ployment, a positive note for those unions 
hoping to organize in the service sector. 
Most of our results parallel those of 
studies of NLRB elections for non-clerical 
units. The negative relationship between 
the size of the unit and the pro-union vote 
indicates that clerical organizers should 
not ignore small units. Also, as expected, 
management resistance significantly af-
fects election results, as indicated by our 
findings regarding stipulated and ordered 
elections. We have provided further evi-
dence of management effectiveness in this 
regard by demonstrating a significant 
negative relationship between employee 
support for unionization and the clerical 
share of employment in an industry. 
Management has a greater incentive to 
resist clerical unions in clerical-intensive 
industries, and is more effective in these 
efforts, than in other industries. 
Our findings on the determinants of 
clerical election outcomes differ from the 
findings of similar studies covering all 
NLRB elections in only one important 
respect: whereas previous studies have 
demonstrated that election delay has a 
significant negative impact on union orga-
nizing success, we have found no such 
relationship in clerical units. Although 
further investigation of this conclusion is 
warranted, we believe that it is consistent 
with the relatively slow organizing process 
typical in clerical campaigns. 
A more complete assessment of the po-
tential for organizing clerical workers will 
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require additional research on clerical at-
titudes toward unions, and on election-
specific details such as relative pay within 
the firm, union organizing strategies, and 
management resistance strategies. We be-
lieve that our focus on environmental fac-
tors is an appropriate starting point for an 
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